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Abstract
China's General Agreement  on Trade in Services  (GATS)  agglomeration of economic activity  in certain regions-
commitments  represent the most radical services reform  to an  extent that is unlikely to be reversed completely  by
program negotiated  in the World Trade Organization.  subsequent countrywide  liberalization.
China has promised  to eliminate over the next few years  * Restrictions  on foreign ownership (temporary  in
most restrictions  on foreign  entry and ownership,  as well  most  sectors but more durable  in telecommunications
as most forms of discrimination  against foreign firms.  and life insurance)  may dampen the  incentives of foreign
These  changes are in themselves  desirable.  However,  investors to improve firm performance.
realizing the gains from,  and perhaps even the  *  Improved prudential regulation and measures  to
sustainability of, liberalization  will require the  deal with the large burden of nonperforming loans on
implementation  of complementary  regulatory reform  and  state banks are necessary to deliver  the benefits of
the appropriate  sequencing of reforms.  Three  issues, in  liberalization  in  financial  services. And in basic
particular,  merit attention:  telecommunications  and other network-based  services,
* Initial restrictions on the geographical  scope of  meaningful  liberalization  will be difficult to achieve
services  liberalization  could  encourage  the further  without strengthened  pro-competitive  regulation.
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The fulfillment of China's accession commitments will lead to one of the most dramatic
episodes of liberalization.  Over the space of some six years, one of the most closed
services markets has promised to become one of the most open.  This paper begins by
describing the policy commitments and then asks whether the implied discipline is
desirable.  This leads to the main policy question:  how is the process of transition best
managed?
There is good reason to believe that the reforms will lead to significant improvements in
the services markets themselves, in terms of prices,  quality, product variety and the
availability of new products.  Our ability to quantify these benefits, however,  is still
limited.  One problem is that the restrictive measures themselves,  mostly barriers to
foreign direct investment,  are not easy to measure.  For instance, how restrictive is the
requirement to enter through a joint venture with minority foreign ownership compared to
a quota on the number of providers?  Another problem is that the result of restrictions on
a particular mode of delivery depend on the degree of substitutability between modes,
which varies  across services  sectors, is changing with technology  and is also not easy to
measure.  For instance, the impact of the numerous restrictions on establishing a legal
firm depends on the extent to which cross-border delivery (a completely unrestricted
mode) is feasible for specific types of legal service.
Apart from the impact of liberalization  on services markets themselves, two questions are
of particular interest.  First,  how will the liberalization of services markets affect the
integration of the Chinese economy, internally and with the rest of the world?  For
instance, will the improvement  in telecommunications  and transport services encourage
the diffusion of economic activity away from the costal enclaves?  Second, how will the
poor be affected  - in the product market, as efficiency increases  but cross-subsidization
ends, and in factor markets,  as the scale of activity expands but surplus labor is shed?
The answer to many of these questions will depend on how the transition to more open
markets is managed.  We know the policy status quo and the destination as specified in
the commitments,  but need first to identify how much discretion China retains in its
choice of policy.  In fact, China's  schedule of commitments  specifies not only the
terminal situation, but also how many of the modifications of policy will be phased  in.
Even though changes in the degree  of competition  and the pattern of ownership are
largely pre-specified, they can be accelerated - GATS commitments  do not prevent a
country  fromn  liberalizing faster than it has said it would.  More importantly, there are still
large degrees of freedom with respect to the nature of domestic regulation.  Three
questions arise.  First, are the transitional  commitments,  for instance with regard to
gradual increase  in foreign ownership  and gradual elimination of geographical
restrictions,  optimal?  Second, what are the regulatory priorities in each sector?  And
third, how are the main elements of the reforms, i.e. the changes in competition,
ownership and regulation,  best sequenced?
2Section I describes China's accession commitments and Section II examines  whether the
implied loss of policy discretion is desirable.  Section III identifies the priorities for
regulatory reform, and Section IV discusses some of the issues relevant to the sequencing
of reform.
I.  CHINA'S ACCESSION  COMMITMENTS
1.1  The GATS framework and services liberalization
The GATS covers all measures taken by Members  affecting trade in services and all
service sectors.1 The Agreement is unusual in taking a wide view of what constitutes
trade,  and defines trade in services as the supply of a service through any of four modes:
mode one, cross-border  supply, is analogous to trade in goods, and arises when a service
crosses a national frontier, e.g. the purchase of software or insurance by a consumer  from
a supplier located abroad;  mode two, consumption abroad, arises when the consumer
travels to the territory of service supplier,  e.g. to purchase tourism, education or health
services;  mode three, commercial  presence involves foreign direct investment, e.g. when
a foreign bank or telecommunications  firm establishes  a branch or subsidiary in the
territory of a country;  mode four, movement of individuals, occurs when independent
service providers or employees of a multinational  firm temporarily move to another
country.
Certain GATS obligations apply across-the-board,  while others depend on the sector-
specific  commitments assumed by individual Members.  The most important of the
general obligations  are transparency  and the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle. The
transparency obligation requires inter alia that each Member publish promptly "all
relevant measures of general application"  (that is, measures other than those which
involve only individual service suppliers) affecting trade in services.  The MFN
obligation prevents Members  from discriminating  among their trading partners.  The
Agreement, however, permits Members to list temporary exemptions to MFN.
The liberalizing content of the GATS depends on the extent and nature of sector-specific
commitments assumed by individual Members.  The core provisions of the GATS  in this
context relate to market access (Article XVI) and national  treatment (Article XVII).
These provisions apply only to sectors explicitly included by a Member in its schedule of
commitments and there too are subject to the limitations that a Member has scheduled.
GATS commitments are guarantees, and the absence of such guarantees  need not mean
that access to a particular market is denied.
The market access provision prohibits six types of limitations, unless they have been
inscribed by a Member in its schedule.  These are:  (a) limitations on the number of
suppliers;  (b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets;  (c)
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of service
'The  only explicit sectoral exclusion  from GATS is  certain  "hard"  rights in  the aviation sector.
3output;  (d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed;  (e)
measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint venture;  and (f)
limitations on the participation of foreign capital.  In scheduled sectors, the existence of
any of these limitations has to be indicated with respect to each of the four modes of
supply described above.
National  treatment  is defined under Article XVII in the traditional GATT manner, as
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like domestic services or service
suppliers.  In contrast to the GATT approach, however, Members may inscribe
limitations on national treatment in their schedules  - with respect to each of the four
modes of supply, as in the case of the market access provision.
1.2  Numerical overview  of commitments:  How different is China?
This section compares China's services commitments to those of other WTO Members.
We proceed in two steps.  First, we take a quick look,  at the state of access today, before
China's liberalization commitments have been phased in, for a representative sample of
sectors.  Figure I compares China's commitments  for each mode with those of
developed, developing  and acceding countries.  On consumption abroad (mode 2),
commercial presence  (mode 3) and the presence of natural persons (mode 4), China has
made at least partial commitments in all the sectors, and on cross-border supply (mode 1)
for over 80 per cent of the sectors.  This compares favorably  with the commitments of all
other country groups.  However, the number of sectors with a guarantee of full access in
China's schedule today are less than those for the other country groups,  with a
particularly significant difference on mode 3.
Figure 1
Commitments  by Mode
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Calculated  on the basis of a sample  of 37 sectors deemed representative for various services sectors.  See Annex Table  I for details on
China and  WTO  Document S/CIW/99,  3 March  1999 for details on other countries.
The upper part of each bar represents  partial  commitments, the lower part full commitments
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LDC = Developing  countries
AC = Acceding countries
CHN = China
4The picture changes quite drastically if we focus on the period after all the liberalization
has been phased in.  Three indicators are computed by lanchovichina et al. (2001)  for
both market access and national treatment commitments:  (i) "count coverage"  indicating
the number of sector/modes-of-supply  combinations  where a commitment was made
relative to the maximum number possible;  (ii) "average  coverage"  providing an
arithmetic weighted average of the weights (0 for no commitment, 1 for a full
commitment  and 0.5 for all partial commitments) allocated to each cell;  and (iii) the "no-
restriction commitments  share" in a country's total commitments as well as in the
maximum possible commitments.
Overall,  for China, the "count coverage" of market access commitments was 57.4 percent
(Table  1).  This  is much higher than the commitments offered in the Uruguay Round by
any other group of countries (including high income countries).  The "average  coverage,"
a weighted average count of sectoral coverage which better reflects the extent of
liberalization of services, was 38 percent for China again more open than even the high
income  countries.  The share of completely liberal commitments in the maximum
possible commitments was 23 percent for China, much higher than that for any other
group of developing countries but somewhat lower than that for high income countries.
China's commitments  on national treatrnent are deeper and wider than those of all other
country groups.
Table 1:  Coverage  of ypecifc  commitments  percent)
Low- and  Large
High-income  middle-income  developing  China
Countries'  countries"'  nations"
Market access
Unweighted  average count (sectors-modes listed as a share of  47.3  16 2  38 6  57 4
maximum possible)
Average  coverage (sectors-modes  listed as a share of  35.9  10 3  22.9  38 1
maximum possible, weighted by openness or binding
factors)
Coveragetcount (average  coverage  as a share of the average  75.9  63  6  59 3  66 4
count)
No restnctions  as a share of total offer (unweighted count)  57 3  45 5  38 7  40.2
No restrictions  as a share  of maximum possible  27  1  7 3  14 9  23.1
National  treatmnent
Unweighted average count (sectors-modes listed as a share of  47 3  16 2  38 8  57 4
maximum possible)
Average coverage (sectors-modes  listed as a share  of  37 2  11.2  25.5  45 0
maximum possible, weighed by openness or binding
factors)
Coverage/count  (average coverage as a share of average  78 6  69 1  66.1  78 4
count)
No restrictions  as a share of total offer (unweighted  count)  65.1  58 0  52 3  63 5
No restrictions  as a share of maximum possible  30 8  9 4  20 2  36 5
Memo item
No restrictions on market access  and national treatment  as a  24.8  6 9  14 3  29 8
share of maximum possible
Number of sectors  committed  293 0  100 0  239 0  356 0
Source  lanchovichina et al (2001)  Note  The breadth and depth of commitments by other countries are understated because their
more recent commitments in telecommunications  and  financial services have not been taken fully into account
51.3  A closer look:  sector by sector
Typical restrictions
In some respects, China's commitments resemble those made by other countries.  For
most sectors,  modes 1 and 2 are either fully open or unbound,  and not subject to specific
restrictions.  Commitments on mode 4, specified horizontally rather than sector by sector,
are also standard:  entry is guaranteed only for managers,  executives  and specialists - who
must either be intra-corporate  transferees or employed by foreign invested enterprises -
and for services salespersons  on exploratory business visits.  No commitments  are made
regarding other categories of natural persons, e.g. unskilled personnel  or movement not
linked to commercial presence.
It is with regard to commitments on commercial presence that we encounter a range of
restrictive measures, relating to:
*  Form of establishment: The typical restriction is the requirement to form a joint
venture (JV) which is either an equity joint venture (EJV) or contractual joint
venture (CJV).  Foreign  ownership in EJVs is frequently restricted to specified
levels, ranging from minority ownership (49% or less), 50%, majority ownership,
to full ownership.  There is no commitment to allow establishment  of branches by
foreign enterprises,  except in specific sectors.
*  Geographic  scope:  Business activity may be allowed only in specified cities (e.g.
Shanghai) or in special  economic zones.
*  Business scope:  Transactions may be permitted only with a subset of consumers
or restricted in some other way.
*  Regulatory requirements: Foreign firms may be required to have a certain
minimum amount of assets and be established as a representative  office for a
certain period of time before commencing  full business  operations.
Interestingly, most restrictions pertain to market access and there are relatively few
limitations on national treatment.  In fact, one of the striking aspects of China's schedules
is the willingness to commit across modes and sectors to full national treatment for
foreign providers.
Commitments  past, present andfuture
How much has policy already changed,  and how will it change over the next few years?
China's schedules of commitments provide a first source of information.  China
participated in the Uruguay Round services negotiations and submitted a schedule under
GATS in April  1994.  Since China was not a Member of the WTO, this schedule did not
have legal status.  More importantly, it is not clear how far this schedule reflected the
actual openness Chinese services markets at that time.  Nevertheless, it does provide
some indication of the situation then.
6As part of its accession negotiations, China submitted a schedule of commitments in
October 2001.  This schedule has legal status ever since China became a WTO Member,
and is an outcome of the toughest services negotiations  undertaken in the WTO.
Whereas most WTO Members have merely bound the policy status quo or even less,
China agreed to significant liberalization to be implemented either immediately or in the
near future.  One consequence is that the schedule describes the state of actual policy at
the time of accession and over the next few years.
Relying on these two schedules, we construct a rough picture in Table 2 of the state of
"policy"  at three points of time:  1994, 2001, the presumed date of accession, and 2008,
the date by which all liberalization commitments will have been phased in (i.e. seven
years after accession).  The earlier date was chosen to show how far China has already
come, and the later date to indicate how far it is committed to go.
Professional  services
Commitments on professional  services are far more liberal than in 1994, and the sector
will be highly liberalized  over the next few years.  Compared to 1994, China is
committed to allow the cross-border supply of professional  services,  quantitative
limitations no longer apply to accountancy firms, taxation services can be offered outside
of "economically  developed areas", and there are meaningful  commitments in urban
planning and legal services.
By 2007,  geographic and quantitative limitations will be eliminated in legal services,  and
fully owned foreign subsidiaries can operate in accounting, taxation,  architecture,
engineering and urban planning  services.  But some restrictions  will persist, especially in
legal and medical services.  Foreign firms are not allowed directly to participate in legal
activity in China and are only entitled to work on legal affairs related to their home
country or to entrust work to Chinese firms on behalf of their clients.  In medical
services, hospitals cannot be fully foreign owned and are still subject to quantitative
limitations in line with China's needs.
Computer and related  services
This is the one sector where some commitments  have actually become less liberal.  In
1994, there were no restrictions on establishment in software implementation,  systems
and software consulting and systems analysis.  Now, establishment  can only take place
through JVs though foreign majority ownership is permitted.  Cross border delivery in
these services remains unbound but is fully open in all other computer  and related
services.  No future liberalization has been specified.
Telecommunications
Much change is anticipated in this sector over the next few years.  Today, foreign
providers can provide value added and mobile services in (and between)  Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Beijing through JVs, subject to stringent restrictions on foreign
7ownership.  By 2004, fixed line services  can be provided on similar terms  in and between
the same cities.  Gradually, by 2007, all geographical restrictions  will be eliminated and
equity restrictions will be relaxed.  But even at the end of the period, majority foreign
ownership will not be allowed in any area.  Furthermore, there is no commitment to allow
cross-border  delivery of any of these services.2
Construction  and engineering  services
Whereas commercial  presence  was unbound in 1994, today it is allowed through JVs
with foreign majority ownership permitted, but only in foreign-invested construction
projects.  By 2004, full foreign ownership will be permitted but subject to certain
restrictions on business scope.
Distribution  services
There were no commitments at all in 1994.  Substantial  liberalization has already taken
place, but restrictions persist on establishment (only through joint ventures), geographical
scope (retailing only in five SEZs) and products sold (e.g. not books, newspapers,
pharmaceuticals  and pesticides).  By 2006, the sector will be largely open.  Perhaps most
strikingly, China has agreed to open up the whole logistical chain of related services,
including inventory  management;  assembly, sorting and grading of bulk lots; breaking
bulk lots and redistributing  into smaller lots; delivery services; refrigeration, storage,
warehousing and garage services; sales promotion, marketing  and advertising,  installation
and after sales services including maintenance and repair and training services.  No WTO
Member has made such deep commitments  in this sector.
Some restrictions will remain.  Salt and tobacco are excluded from the scope of
commitrnents  on commission agents and wholesalers.  Furthermore,  majority foreign
ownership will not be allowed in retail chain stores which sell multiple products  and
different brands of products  such as books, newspapers,  pharmaceuticals  and chemical
fertilizers,  and have more than 30 outlets.  There are no commitments on cross-border
delivery of commission agents and wholesale trade services.  More interestingly,  cross-
border supply of retail  services is allowed only through mail-order, which presumably
covers electronic  commerce.
Education services
Cross-border delivery was unbound in 1994 but is now fully open.  Commercial presence
was also unbound but now caPkbe established through JVs with foreign majority
ownership permitted.  National  treatment is not, however, guaranteed  for foreign
educational institutions.
2 The commitment  on mode I indicates a cross-reference to mode 3, the meaning of which is not clear
8Financial  services
The 1994 commitments specified that insurance services could be supplied through a
branch or JV only in Shanghai  subject to a number of conditions pertaining to minimum
capital and prior presence,  globally (thirty years as an insurance company)  and locally
(three years as a representative  office).  On accession,  non-life insurers  are permitted to
open a branch or JV with 51 per cent foreign ownership,  whereas life insurers are
permitted 50 per cent ownership of a JV in a partner of their choice.  Non-life insurers
can provide "master policy" insurance and insurance of large scale commercial risks
without geographic restrictions, and insurance of enterprises  abroad as well as property
insurance, related liability insurance and credit insurance of foreign-invested  enterprises
in five cities:  Shanghai,  Guangzhou, Dalian, Shenzhen and Foshan.  Life insurers are
permitted to provide individual (not group) insurance to foreigners  and Chinese citizens
in the same five cities.  By 2004, all restrictions  will disappear except the foreign
ownership limit on life insurers.  Licenses are to be awarded solely on the basis of
prudential criteria and with no application of quantitative limitations or economic needs
tests.
Under the 1994 commitments,  foreign banks could only operate in specified regions,
accept deposits only from non-residents and only in foreign currencies (with some
exceptions),  and make no loans to Chinese citizens.  On accession,  geographic and client
limitations will be eliminated for foreign currency business.  Even though the schedule
states that on accession, local currency business will be allowed in 4 cities (Shanghai,
Shenzhen, Tianjin and Dalian), there seems to be a binding restriction on clients which
will only be relaxed in two years. The entire banking sector will be fully liberalized by
2006.  As in the case of insurance,  licenses are to be awarded solely on the basis of
prudential criteria with no quantitative  limitations or economic needs test applied.
There were no commitments on securities in 1994.  On accession, JVs with up to 33%
foreign ownership will be allowed to conduct domestic securities investment fund
management business.  By 2004, foreign ownership of such ventures will be allowed to
increase to 49 per cent.  Furthermore, joint ventures with up to 33 per cent foreign
ownership will be allowed to underwrite domestic  equity issues and underwrite and trade
in international equity and all corporate and government debt issues.
Transport  services
There were liberal commitments  on international  maritime transport and certain
supporting services even in  1994.  The major change is that the depth of commitments
across the whole range of transport and auxiliary services will greatly facilitate the
provision of multimodal transport services.  In road, rail and key auxiliary  services,
notably storage and warehousing and freight forwarding agency services, restrictive or no
commitments shall be replaced on accession by the requirement to enter as joint ventures,
and by 2007 there shall be full liberalization.  The exception will, of course, be hard
rights in air transport which are excluded from the scope of the GATS.
9II.  THE LOST FREEDOMS:  CAUSE  FOR CONCERN?
The commitments  described above imply a dramatic loss of discretion in policy-making.
China has promised to give up, over the next few years, the freedom to restrict new entry
and foreign ownership,  discriminate between trading partners and in favor of its own
firms, and, most generally,  the freedom to change its mind.  For the most part, the
implied discipline is desirable.  But the size and distribution of the gains from
liberalization will depend on how China uses the freedom it still has to strengthen its
regulatory framework and choose an appropriate sequence  of reform.
11.1  The freedom  to change your mind: Credibility through GATS commitments
In many areas, the Chinese Government has been reluctant to liberalize immediately.
Some of the protection is probably a consequence  of political economic pressures from
vested interests.  But in some cases, the Government evidently felt the need to protect the
incumbent suppliers from competition either because of infant industry type arguments  or
to facilitate  "orderly exit" - both of which are arguments for temporary protection.  But
protection once granted can be difficult to remove.  The failure of infant industry policies
in the past, and the innumerable examples of perpetual  infancy (or senility), is
attributable in part to the inability of a government to commit itself to liberalize at some
future date and hence to confront incumbents with a credible deadline.  The binding
commitments under the GATS to provide  market access by a precise future dates should
help to overcome the credibility problem. Failure to honor these commitments creates  an
obligation to compensate  those who are deprived of benefits, making the commitment
more credible than a mere announcement of liberalizing intent in the national context.
The price in terms of the loss of flexibility would seem to be worth paying.
It is also worth emphasizing that GATS commitments represent only a ceiling on
protection and not a floor.  China has given up the freedom to liberalize more slowly than
specified in its GATS commitments,  but it still has the freedom to move faster.
11.2  The freedom to discriminate between  trading partners and in favor of
domestic firms
The two pillars of non-discrimination  under the GATS are the MFN and national
treatment obligations, both of which allow exceptions to be listed.  China's MFN
exemptions are relatively narrow.  The only one listed applies to international maritime
transport, for cargo sharing agreements with certain countries and to allow JVs and
wholly-owned shipping subsidiaries to be formed on the basis of bilateral agreements.  In
any case,  since China has committed to full market access and national treatment on
cross-border  supply, there seems to be little scope for discriminatory  cargo sharing.
10There are also surprisingly few limitations on national treatment,  and so for the most part
China has given up the right to offer preferential treatment to domestic enterprises
through any measure affecting the supply of services.  There is virtually no scope for
discriminatory taxation, and discriminatory subsidies can be awarded only in aviation,
audiovisual and medical services - and there too only to the extent that such subsidies
already exist.  The other instances of discriminatory provisions are the following:  all
legal representatives  are required to be resident in China for no less than six months each
year;  a majority of doctors  in JV hospitals must be Chinese;  the existing registered
capital requirements  for JV construction enterprises are slightly different from those of
domestic enterprises;  JV travel  agencies are not allowed to provide services to Chinese
traveling abroad;  and foreign insurers are subject to a 20 per cent cession requirement
with a Chinese Reinsurance  company, to be phased out in four years.
But while the scope for explicit discrimination has shrunk, the nature of measures
affecting trade in services does offer considerable scope for implicit discrimination.  First
of all, there is the possibility of variable treatment through domestic regulations  such as
licensing, recognition of qualifications  and other technical  regulations.  Such discretion  is
likely to be constrained,  but probably not eliminated, by the assurance that licenses in
financial services will be issued solely on the basis of prudential criteria and by the
requirement  of transparency of licensing criteria and decision processes in other areas.
Second,  China has retained the freedom to impose explicit quantitative restrictions on the
number of providers  in legal, medical and retailing services.  There may also be de facto
quotas in some areas, such as those imposed by the scarcity of radio spectrum needed for
the provision of mobile telecommunications  services, and scarcity of space for
department stores or airports in a city.
The GATS MFN obligation applies both to domestic regulations  and quotas but there are
no precise rules to give this obligation practical content. Article VII of the GATS dealing
specifically with recognition  agreements pertaining to educational  qualifications,
licenses, etc. strikes a delicate balance by allowing such agreements,  provided they are
not used as a means of discrimination and third countries have the opportunity to accede
or demonstrate equivalence.  There are no rules to ensure the non-discriminatory
allocation of quotas. In the past, this was not a major issue because commitments
reflected  the status quo and quotas, particularly with regard to service suppliers, were
descriptions of the existing market structure.  In the future, as genuine liberalizing
commitments are made, the non-discriminatory  allocation of quotas is bound to be an
important issue. The instinctive candidate for a non-discriminatory  rule is an auction,
which also has the virtue of transferring quota rents to the government.  It remains to be
seen whether the Chinese regulators can resist the temptation to resort to other more
discretionary methods of allocating quotas.
It may seem at first sight that there is no real cost to granting preferential treatment  in
services.  Since the protective instrument is often a restrictive  regulation which does not
generate revenue (or rents), there is no cost to granting preferential  access because there
is no revenue (or rents) to lose.  When the protective  instrument is a quota, the
implications of preferences  depend on who appropriates the rents.  Where rents are
11appropriated by exporters or dissipated, preferential  liberalization  is again necessarily
welfare  enhancing for the importing country.
However,  preferences  in services  may  impose other more subtle costs.  The cost of trade
diversion  may well be the establishment of poorer quality providers,  not just in terms of
poorer  quality  services  but  also  smaller  social  benefits  in the  form  of knowledge  and
technological  spillovers.  Furthermore,  the greater  importance of sunk costs in a number
of services sectors, ranging from basic telecommunications to financial services,  suggests
that  preferential  liberalization may have  more durable  consequences  than in the  case of
goods.  For  example,  allowing  the  second-best  provider  to  establish  may mean  that  a
country  is stuck with such a provider  even  when it subsequently  liberalizes  on an MFN
basis.3 These  considerations  suggest that  China  would  do well  to resist  the  reported
pressure to grant preferential  access to the service suppliers of certain WTO Members.
Grandfather  provisions
One of the key difficulties in the accession negotiations arose because of the presence in
the Chinese insurance market of firms which enjoyed better conditions than China was
prepared to guarantee to new entrants.  In particular, the United States life insurance firm
AIG was established in Shanghai with full foreign ownership;  Allianz (German), Axa
(French) and Manulife (Canadian)  were 51 per cent foreign owned.  As we have seen
above,  the best China was prepared to offer new entrants was entry through JVs which
were 50 per cent foreign-owned.  Apparently, this asymmetry in itself was generally
acceptable and led to the following "grandfather"  provision in China's schedule:
"The conditions of ownership,  operation and scope  of activities, as set out in the
respective contractual  or shareholder agreement or in a license establishing  or
authorizing  the operation or supply of services by an existing foreign service
supplier, will not be made more restrictive  than they exist as of the date of China's
accession to the WTO."
The problem arose because of the implications for branching rights.  The key element of
China's commitment was the guarantee that "internal  branching for an insurance firm
will be permitted consistent with the phase out of geographic restrictions".  In effect, AIG
would be able to expand operations through branches of its fully owned subsidiary in
China whereas other new firms could only do so through branches of their 50 per cent
owned JVs.  This was apparently  not acceptable  to the European Union.  The eventual
compromise was a rather convoluted footnote in the Schedule which states:
"Any further authorization provided to foreign insurers after accession under
more favorable conditions than those contained in this schedule (including the
extension of grandfathered investments through branching, sub-branching  or any
other legal form), will be made available to other foreign service suppliers which
so requested."
Where  this happens  will depend  on the importance  of sunk costs relative  to differences  in costs  and
quality.
12The solution is messy and could lead to a dispute.  If AIG is denied the right to branch
from its fully-owned  subsidiary, then the US could claim that the assurance contained in
the grandfather and internal branching commitments were not being respected.  If AIG
were allowed  the right to branch,  and the EU were  denied the right to establish fully
owned subsidiaries, then the latter could claim that the assurance contained in the
footnote was not being respected.4
Apart from the legal question of the consistency  of the grandfather provisions with MFN,
these provisions reflect  a relative emphasis on guaranteeing the rights of incumbents.  In
so far as they provide the benefits of security to investors who are already present in the
market rather than to new investors,  they may not do enough to make markets more
contestable.  New entrants may even be placed at a competitive disadvantage  insofar as
differences in ownership and legal form affect firm performance.  For example,  larger
equity shares may make it easier to exercise  effective control over the operations of a
firm and ensure efficient production, and the marginal cost of providing  a service through
a branch may be lower than through a subsidiary.  However,  the fact that there are
already several foreign and domestic firms competing  in the market may limit the impact
of these grandfather provisions.
11.3  The freedom to restrict entry
Apart from the few instances noted above, China has chosen not to limit the number of
service providers.  The only barrier to new entry is the requirement to enter as a JV,
which is discussed in the next section.  Might this be a problem? Are there good reasons
to limit entry?  Entry restrictions might be justified by the existence of significant
economies of scale, e.g. if  there are substantial fixed costs of networks,  competitive entry
could lead to inefficient network  duplication.5 However, entry restrictions are
increasingly hard to defend in principle, in the face of technological change  and in the
face of mounting evidence that competition works.
First of all, entry restrictions change the nature of interaction  between incumbents  and
may well make collusion more likely.  Secondly, such restrictions dampen the impact of
competition on productive efficiency.  Third, the regulator is usually not better placed
4It was reported in the Financial  Times of 6 December  2001  that a compromise  had been  reached on this
issue.  Apparently,  AIG would be given permission to open two more  100 percent owned branches,  but
would thereafter have to abide by the same 50 percent rule as all other foreign  insurers in the China market.
The deal  was seen as consistent  with WTO rules because the two extra licenses were to be awarded to AIG
before China entered the WTO on I I December 2001.  The licenses  were to be granted  for the cities of
Suzhou, near  Shanghai, and Beijing, the capital.
5 One such possibility is the case of "non-sustainability"  of natural  monopoly.  This  could arise,  for
instance,  under some natural monopoly cost conditions,  when there exist no prices that will not attract
entry, even though single  firm supply is efficient.  Armstrong et al. (1994,  p 106) conclude  that
"Notwithstanding  the logical possibility of this happening,  we are doubtful whether  it provides a good case
for entry restrictions  in the utility industries,  which are not for the most part remotely contestable  and
where there is little evidence  that cost conditions  give rise to non-sustainability."
13than the competitive process to determine the optimal number of firms in the market,
especially given the difficulty of obtaining information about the cost structure of firms
and other sources of regulatory failure.  Furthermore,  technological  advances have
significantly lowered network costs even in a sector like fixed line telecommunications,
and vertical  separation (e.g. through network unbundling) has widened the scope for
competitive  entry (Smith,  1995).  Inefficiencies introduced  by duplication of networks
may be small compared to operational  inefficiencies that can result from a lack of
competitive pressure.6 On this basis, it would seem that there is little reason to worry
about excessive  entry;  rather the priority should be the elimination of the barriers to
entry where they remain, e.g.  in medical services and retailing.
11.4  The freedom to restrict ownership
The most important restriction on foreign presence in China is the requirement to enter as
a joint venture,  often with limits on the extent of foreign ownership.  In most areas, these
limits on ownership are being gradually phased out, but in some cases,  e.g.
telecommunications  and life insurance, they will remain even after all the liberalization
commitments have been phased out.  What is the rational for such restrictions and what
are their implications?  Furthermore, what are the consequences  of the manner in which
they are being phased out?
Joint ventures may, of course, be the preferred choice of the foreign investor if, for
instance,  local firms have specific assets access to which can only be obtained through
collaboration.  However,  binding ownership restrictions  may adversely  affect firm
performance,  because the incentive to undertake costly transfers of technology and
improvements  in management  is related to the expected gains, which in turn are related to
the share in profits of an owner.  Moreover,  changes in the permissible  share of
ownership in the vicinity of 50 per cent (e.g from 49 per cent to  51 per cent) may have  a
particularly  large impact on performance as a firm obtains full control over a firms
operations and has greater freedom to make the changes  it deems necessary.
Why is the Chinese governments  willing to bear such costs even for a few years?  Four
types of reasons are possible.  Limitations on ownership may seek to balance the
efficiency-enhancing and the rent-appropriation aspects of foreign investment.  However,
rent appropriation  could to some extent be prevented by ex ante auctions of equity or ex
post taxation of profits.7 And a more basic question is why rent-generating  restrictions
6 Interesting  evidence in  this context is  available from the Indian telecommunications  sector.  Das (2000)
estimates a frontier multi-product  cost function of the incumbent fixed-line  operator,  covering 25 years
from  1969 to 1994.  The study finds the  existence of very high economies of both scale and scope in  the
technology used -the parameter estimates even suggest that telecommunications in  India is a  natural
monopoly.  However, the  incumbent operator displays great inefficiency,  leading to a 26 percent  increase
of the operator's  cost of production.  Based on these findings,  Das concludes  that India's market
liberalization  program,  started in the mid-1990s, is justified, but he argues that there may be a need to
regulate entry in order to reduce unnecessary duplication of common costs.  Moreover, with continued
improvements in technology, the fixed costs of entrants are likely to fall, reducing losses of scale
economies  and thus increasing  the costs of entry restrictions.
7  The fear of creating a disincentive  for investors might be a(reason to refrain  from taxation.
14on competition continue to exist.  Secondly, there is an "infant entrepreneur"  argument:
foreigners are induced to form equity joint ventures so that local investors can learn by
collaborating.  As with all such arguments it is difficult to judge whether the current costs
are likely to be offset by the eventual benefits.  Thirdly, there is an adjustment cost
argument: an immediate transfer of control could lead to drastic cuts in surplus labor
which gradual reductions in ownership help prevent.  A key issue is whether it is possible
to address these adjustment costs through direct support to the affected factors rather than
by staggered  liberalization.  Finally,  the most important reason is probably a purely
political reluctance to allow foreign control of an essential service.  Again,  these political
concerns should be less strong if it is not one foreign monopolist but a number of
competing foreign firms that provide the service.
III.  THE FREEDOM THAT REMAINS:  RESPONDING TO THE
REGULATORY  CHALLENGE
If China is to make the most of liberalization that it is now committed to undertake, then
improving the regulatory framework is critical.  Regulation in services,  as in goods, arises
essentially from market failure attributable  to the problems of natural monopoly and
inadequate  consumer information,  and from considerations of equity,  across geographic
regions and income classes.
111.1  Efficient regulation: Making competition work
The first regulatory priority arises in the so called "locational  services"  which are
frequently characterized by natural monopoly or oligopoly.  These markets tend to be
concentrated because of the large fixed costs required to create  specialized distribution
networks:  roads and rails for land transport,  cables and satellites for communications,
and pipes for sewage and energy distribution (UNCTAD and World Bank,  1994).  Unless
appropriate regulatory mechanisms  are put in place, the incumbent can frustrate
competition by denying rivals access to essential facilities such as distribution networks
and terminals.
China has accepted the regulatory principles specified in the Telecommunications
Reference Paper.  Thus it has committed to instituting an independent regulator for basic
telecommunications  services to ensure that the incumbent supplier does not undermine
market access by charging  prohibitive rates for interconnection to its established
networks.8 In fact, a new supra-ministerial body, the State Council Information
Management Commission, has recently been set up and is headed by Zhu Rongji, the
premier, and Hu Jintao, the vice-president.  The commission's  establishment has not yet
8 Several  countries  have found it difficult to create open,  competitive telecommunications  sector because
of a weak regulatory environment  Poland  opened up  its telecommunications  sector to private competition
as early as 1990  There was a rush to invest, and about 200 licenses  were awarded  in the first six years of
the newly liberalized  regime.  The dominant state operator,  operating in a weak regulatory system, limited
access to its network and  benefited from unequal  terms for revenue  sharing, however.  By  1996, only  12 of
the 200 licenses were still being used by the few competitive operators to survive.
15been announced, but it is believed to be modeled on the US Federal Communications
Commission.9 A similar approach needs to be taken in a variety of other network
services,  including transport (terminals and infrastructure),  and energy services
(distribution  networks).
The creation of a regulator is only a first step.  Persuading the dominant interest groups to
concede control is fraught with difficulty.  For example, in India, a conflict between the
Department of Telecommunications  (DOT) and the regulatory agency,
Telecommunications  Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), as it was initially
constituted,  hampered progress towards an efficient telecom infrastructure.  0  Absent a
truly independent regulator, empowered to rebalance tariffs, enforce fair  interconnection
agreements,  and ensure rapid, equitable issuance of radio spectrum, the benefits of  a
sector opened to allow private participation and foreign investment could be significantly
limited.
In certain market segments, it may not be possible to create conditions for effective
competition  in the supplies of certain telecommunications,  transport and financial
services, even if  all barriers to entry are eliminated.  For two related reasons.  First,
unlike in the case of goods,  national markets are often segmented from the international
market due to the infeasibility of cross-border  delivery.  Secondly, changing technologies
may have reduced the optimal scale of operation as well as sunk costs in these sectors,
but not enough for small markets to sustain competitive  market structures.  Some form of
final price regulation may, therefore, be unavoidable.
111.2  Regulation to remedy inadequate consumer information
In China's increasingly open markets,  priority must be given to strengthening the quality
of prudential regulation in intermediation and knowledge-based  services, where
consumers have difficulty securing  full information  about the quality of service they are
buying (UNCTAD  and World Bank, 1994).  For example, consumers cannot easily
assess the competence of professionals  such as doctors and lawyers, the safety of
transport services or the soundness of banks and insurance  companies.  When such
information is costly to obtain and disseminate, and consumers have similar preferences
about the relevant attributes of the service supplier, the regulation of entry and operations
in a sector could increase social welfare.  However, the establishment of institutions
competent to regulate well is a serious challenge, as is revealed by the difficulties  in the
financial sector-not only in a number of developing countries but also in the U.S.,
Sweden and Finland in the 1980s and  1990s.
9  Financial  Times,  17  October 2001.  Some concern has been expressed  about the autonomy of
regulators,  because the telecommunications  regulator  was apparently  the main shareholder in China
Telecom and China Mobile and the television regulator owns China Central Television,  the state TV
company  (Financial Times,  3  January 2002).
'°  The Indian Government  announced a new telecommunications  policy on March 26,  1999 that addressed
several of these key outstanding issues.
16A separate problem is that domestic regulations to deal with the market failure may
themselves  become impediments to competition and trade, as a result of differences
across jurisdictions in technical  standards, prudential regulations,  and qualification
requirements in professional,  financial and numerous other services.  For instance,  China
requires foreign doctors to obtain a license from the Ministry of Public Health and
foreign accountants  to pass the Chinese national CPA examination.  In many cases, the
impact on trade is an incidental  consequence  of the pursuit of a legitimate objective, but
in some cases regulation can be a particularly attractive means of protecting domestic
suppliers  from foreign competition.  Multilateral trade rules on domestic regulations may
contribute to domestic reform by helping sift the legitimate from the protectionist.  To
this end, negotiations are underway to develop GATS rules for domestic regulations.  The
core of these disciplines may well be the so called "necessity test" which seeks to
establish whether a particular regulation is more burdensome than necessary to achieve a
legitimate objective.
111.3  Regulation  to ensure universal service
Two quite different equity-related concerns arise.  First, opening up essential  services to
foreign or domestic competition  could have an adverse effect on the poor-which  is
often cited as a reason  for the persistence of public monopolies.  However, a more
efficient  solution is to have regulations  with a social purpose.  Second, the restrictions on
the geographical scope of services liberalization  could have a strong and durable impact
on the distribution of economic activity across regions.
Where China is a relatively inefficient producer of a service, liberalization and the
resultant foreign competition  are likely to lead to lead to a decline in domestic prices and
improvement  in quality.  But there is a twist. Frequently,  the prices pre-liberalization
were not determined  by the market but set administratively,  and are kept artificially low
for certain categories of end-users  and/or types of services  products.  Thus, rural
borrowers paid lower interest rates than urban borrowers, and prices of local telephone
calls and public transport were kept lower than cost of provision. This structure of prices
is sustained through cross-subsidization  within public monopolies or through government
financial support.  Liberalization threatens these arrangements.  Elimination of
restrictions on entry imply an end to cross-subsidization  because it is no longer possible
for firms to make extra-normal  profits in certain market segments.  And privatization
could mean the end of government support.
Reform programs can accommodate universal service obligations by imposing this
requirement  on new entrants in a non-discriminatory  way.  Thus, such obligations  were
part of the license conditions for new entrants into fixed network telephony and transport
in several countries.  However, subsidies have often proved more successful than direct
regulation in ensuring universal access (Estache et al., 2001). The Chilean government
adopted a scheme that permitted it to leverage over $2 million in public funds into $40
17million in private investment; this resulted in installation of telephones in 1,000 localities
at about ten percent of the costs of direct public provision. Public subsidies can also be
directed to  the consumer rather than the provider (Cowhey and Klimenko,  1999).  The
choice of appropriate instrument will probably have to be made on a sector-by-sector
basis.
Phased  liberalization  and geographical  inequalities
A remarkable  feature of China's dramatic expansion in international trade over the past
two decades has been the concentration of export-oriented industries in coastal regions.
The four main coastal provinces (Guangdong,  Jiangsu, Fujian,  and Shangkai)  have been
the main recipients of outward-oriented  foreign investment, with the remaining portion
going to either other coastal provinces or regions adjoining coastal areas.  Thus, while
China's economic reforms have been successful in raising living standards  for a
considerable  share of the population,  a large number of Chinese people in inland
provinces still live below the poverty line.
A factor responsible for coastal agglomeration has been the inefficiencies  in China's
internal service systems, ranging from transport to telecommunications.  Transport
infrastructure  disparities between the coastal and inland provinces narrowed considerably
following policies aimed at promoting more regionally balanced economic  development
since  1990.  But there is evidence to suggest that it is not the availability of transport
infrastructure per se that precluded inland provinces  from actively participating in foreign
trade.  Rather, the inadequacies associated with transport services are the more binding
constraint in better integrating China's hinterland economy.II
The geographical  limitations on liberalization commitments could well accentuate these
inter-regional  inequalities,  even though the limitations  are to be phased out over time.
The existing enclaves of development  are likely to witness faster improvements  in service
quality resulting  from early liberalization.  These improvements  will cause even more
economic activity to gravitate  to these areas.  Eventually,  with liberalization of services
in the hinterland, there may be greater diffusion of activity.  But in so far as sunk costs
are important, the earlier agglomeration is unlikely to be completely reversible and
inequalities may persist.  These considerations  would seem to strengthen  the case for
eliminating the geographical restrictions simultaneously rather than sequentially.
" For instance, though there has been significant  increase in the volume of container traffic in China since
1990, the increase  is largely confined to coastal regions,  and associated with the ocean-going  leg of travel.
Container traffic in inland areas is  much less, with no significant  change in  the percentage of sea borne
containers traveling beyond port cities and coastal provinces.  Truck rates for moving a container 500
kilometers inland  are estimated to be about three times more, and the trip time five times longer, than they
would be in Europe or United States.  The inter-modal transport  system was found to be poorly integrated,
with no streamlined procedures to support the continuous movement of containers between the coast and
inlands
18111.4  Adjustment costs
Different modes of supply have different effects on factor markets.  Cross-border trade
and consumption abroad resemble goods trade in their implications.  The impact of the
movement of factors depend critically on whether they are substitutes  or complements  for
domestic factor services.  Given the structure of factor prices in China, we would typically
expect liberalization to lead to an inflow of capital and skilled workers.  Such inflows
would tend to be to the advantage of the unskilled poor-increasing  employment
opportunities and wages.12  Interestingly,  it has been shown that even when foreigners
compete with local skilled workers in a services sector, the productivity boost to the
sector from allowing foreigners access  could lead to an increase in the demand for
domestic skilled workers - the scale effect could outweigh the substitution  effect
(Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr, 2000).  Given these predictions, why are workers in
China sometimes skeptical about the benefits of liberalization?  One concern is the
possible reduction in employment in formerly public monopolies which have frequently
employed surplus labor.
But there is also evidence that pessimism may not always be justified.  For example, a
number of developing countries have managed to maintain or even increase employment
in their liberalized telecommunications  sectors.  Since China still has a low teledensity
outside the big cities (in the vicinity of 10  lines per 100 people), a large part of telecom
investment is being directed towards building wire line and mobile networks which are
labor intensive and probably helping to maintain or raise employment levels.  The
introduction of competition should help.  For instance, Petrazzini and Lovelock (1996)
find in a study of 26 Latin American and Asian economies that telecom markets with
competition were the only ones that consistently increased employment levels, while two
thirds of the countries with monopolies saw considerable declines in their telecom work
force.  Despite these optimistic projections,  it is likely that reform programs will require
complementary policies to mitigate any social and economic costs of adjustment in factor
markets.
IV.  SEQUENCING REGULATORY REFORM AND TRADE AND
INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION
Regulatory improvements take time.  Changes in the patterns of competition  and
ownership can be implemented instantaneously  in principle, but China,  like many other
countries, has chosen to introduce  changes gradually.  One question is: how does the
impact of different elements of reform depend on the extent to which other reforms have
been implemented,  i.e. how does the interaction  of the different elements of policy
reform affect performance?  The other, more subtle question is, does the sequence of
reforms have transitory and permanent effects on performance?  Some preliminary
12 The poor are likely to be unskilled, so the question arises as to which services sectors are they likely to be
employed in?  Data on the skill composition of the work force in services sectors is only available at a
rather aggregate level.  Still a certain pattern can be inferred.  Construction, distribution and personal
services tend to be unskilled-labor  intensive,  whereas communications,  financial and business services tend
to be skilled-labor intensive.
19observations on these questions, which are relevant to the design of transition strategies,
are presented below.
Telecommunications
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of telecommunications liberalization in a number of Asian
countries.  China is among the few that have allowed some degree of competition (in long
distance services) prior to allowing a change of ownership in the incumbent supplier and
creating an independent regulator.  Fink et al (2001), in a study of telecommunications
reform in Asia, Africa and Latin America,  find that while each element of reform has a
positive impact on performance,  the effect of each is magnified when others are also
implemented.  Moreover, privatizing the incumbent  after introducing competition  (the
Chinese route), is likely to lead to a higher level of mainline penetration than the opposite
sequence.
Privatization before introducing competition may create a privileged  incumbent who has
a first-mover advantage in the market.  The incumbent may be able to make certain
strategic decisions or indulge in lobbying to affect the eventual form of  competition.'3
For instance, in South Africa,  foreign and domestic shareholders  in the privatized
telecommunications  monopoly managed to persuade the government to allow only one
new entrant rather than the planned two.  Regulating the terms of interconnection  for new
entrants may also be more difficult in an arms-length relationship with a private provider
whose costs are difficult to observe than with a public provider whose cost information
may be easier to access.  Entry may be easier on symmetric terms with an inefficient
public incumbent than on asymmetric terms with an efficient private incumbent.
Financial  services
In financial  services, internationalization  raises several concerns: the threat to the survival
of local banks and financial  companies; the loss of monetary autonomy;  and the increased
volatility of capital flows. Many of these concerns do not relate just to
internationalization  of financial services, but also to the processes of financial
deregulation and capital account liberalization.  But the extent of benefits and costs of
internationalization  depend, to a great extent, on how it is phased in with these other two
types of financial  reforn,  and, in particular,  the strengthening of prudential regulation
and supervision.
Many countries that have successful  experiences  opening up to foreign financial firms
(Brazil, Chile, Hungary,  Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Spain and others) also engaged in a
process of domestic deregulation and, consequently, reaped substantial gains (World
Bank, 2001). The experience of the countries acceding to the EU, suggests that
internationalization  and domestic deregulation can be mutually reinforcing. Increased
foreign entry bolstered the financial  sector framework by creating a constituency for
improved regulation and supervision,  better disclosure rules, and improvements in the
'  A public  sector provider could  also behave in  this way but presumably  if the government'  objective is
liberalization,  it is  somewhat easier  to draw  along a public provider.
20legal and regulatory framnework for the provision of financial services.  It also added to
the credibility of rules.
Most of these considerations  are relevant to China.  Non-perfonning loans account for
about 28%  (the unofficial figure is about 50%) or more of the assets of the big four
banks, which account for about 80% of total banking  sector assets'4. The big four are
already thought to be insolvent (Fitch and Moody's). One of the main reasons for the
existence of large amounts of bad loans is that interest rates are still controlled by the
People's Bank of China (PBOC). They are unusually low in order to make it easier for
state owned enterprises to borrow funds at well below the market clearing equilibrium
rate of interest.1lThis has engineered a huge transfer of wealth from individual savers to
state-owned enterprises.  Two-thirds of credit resources went to state owned enterprises
that generate  only one-third of industrial output. The official target of 2003 for interest
rate liberalization has already been unofficially pushed back to 2005  for fear that the
ensuing competition for deposits will drive business away from the four large banks,
which would then collapse, leading to a serious banking  crisis. 16
While the two reform processes (internationalization  and domestic financial deregulation)
are mutually reinforcing, they are not sufficient in themselves.  More than in other sectors,
the gains and costs of financial reform depend on the regulatory and supervisory
framework, (Barth et al., 2001). Experience  shows that it is vital to strengthen the
supporting institutional framework in parallel with domestic deregulation  and
internationalization.  In the absence of such strengthening,  foreign entry may entail risks.
Foreign bank entry can destabilize local banks by taking away the lowest risk
business-including large, exporting firms-leaving local banks to venture  further out on
the risk frontier.
Having a supportive institutional framework is even more obvious when it comes to
capital account liberalization.' 7 Experiences in recent years, most recently in Asia, have
shown that achieving the potential gains, and avoiding the risks, of capital account
liberalization depend to a great extent on whether domestic institutions and prudential
authorities have developed sufficiently to ensure that foreign finance will be channeled in
productive directions (Eichengreen,  2002).
4 David Lague (2001),  and Financial Times  Surveys on China,  October 2001.
'5 In  1995, savings  deposits received  interest at a paltry 3.15 %, while  loans for working  capital were
being charged only  11 % - they  should have  been charged  about 21 % after factoring  in the rate of
inflation.  The current one year rate on savings deposits is about 2.25%.
16 Source:  Business China,  May 7", 2001.
'7  Since China has made only limited  commitments on cross-border  trade in financial services,  its GATS
commitments  do not require it to allow a high degree of capital  mobility, except  in so far as capital
inflows are required to establish commercial  presence.
21V.  CONCLUSION
China's GATS  commitments represent the most radical services reform program
negotiated in the WTO.  China has promised to eliminate over the next few years most
restrictions  on foreign entry and ownership,  as well as most forms of discrimination
against foreign firms.  Trading partners are naturally interested in ensuring the
implementation  of these commitments.18 However,  realizing the gains from, and perhaps
even the sustainability of, liberalization will require the implementation of
complementary regulatory reform and the appropriate sequencing of reforms.
Three issues in particular deserve  attention.  Initial restrictions on the geographical  scope
of services liberalization could encourage the further  agglomeration of economic activity
in certain regions - to an extent that is unlikely to be reversed  completely by subsequent
country-wide  liberalization.  It may, therefore,  be worth examining whether these
restrictions could be phased out more quickly.  Secondly,  restrictions on foreign
ownership (temporary in most sectors but more durable in telecommunications  and life
insurance)  may dampen the incentives of foreign investors to improve firm performance.
The rationale for these restrictions also merits greater scrutiny.  Finally, improved
prudential  regulation and measures to deal with the large burden of non-performing  loans
on state banks are needed to deliver the benefits of liberalization in financial  services; and
in basic telecommunications  and other network-based  services, meaningful liberalization
will be difficult to achieve without strengthened  pro-competitive regulation.
18  In fact, the United States has already raised the issue  in the WTO's Services Council about whether
China's current rules for express delivery services and branching by non-life  insurance  companies conform
to  its GATS commitments  (Inside US Trade, 29 March  2002).
22Table 2:  China's Commitments:  Past, Present and Future
PROFESSIONAL  SERVICES
Sector  1994  2001  2008
Legal services  No commitments  Modes I &  2  none  CONTINUED
Mode 3  Only though one rep  RESTRICTIONS  ON
office which is allowed to  BUSINESS SCOPE
engage in profit-making
activities, but only in specified  Mode 3.  Geographic  and
cities  Business  scope  quantitative limitations will be
restncted to home country  eliminated by 2002
legal affairs  for Chinese and
China-based clients, and to
entrusting, on behalf of foreign
clients, Chinese law firms to
deal  with Chinese legal affairs.
Accounting, auditng and  Modes  I &  2  unbound  FULLY LIBERALIZED
bookkeeping services  Mode 3  Through branch  except that partnerships  and
offices and CJVs subject to  incorporated  accounting firms
limitations  on minimum size,  are  limited to CPAs licensed
aggregate number (15), and  by Chinese authorities
geographical  scope (SEZs)
Auditing reports are only valid
if a Chinese CPA title is
obtained
Taxation  Mode 1. none  FULLY LIBERALIZED
Mode 2  unbound  Mode 2  none
Mode 3  Through branch  Mode 3  Only through CJVs,  Mode 3  none, wholly foreign
offices subject to limitations  with majonty foreign  owned subsidiaries  permitted
on minimum size and  ownership permitted  by 2007
geographical  scope  (SEZs)
Architecture  and engineering  Mode  1: unbound  Mode  I: none for scheme  FULLY LIBERALIZED
Mode 2  none  design,  otherwise cooperation  EXCEPT FOR MODE I
Mode 3  only through  an EJV  with Chinese professional  RESTRICTIONS.
or CJV  Registered  in own  organisations  is required
country  Mode 3  only through an EJV  Mode 3  wholly foreign owned
or CJV  Registered  in own  subsidianes  permitted by
country and engaged  in  2006
architecture/engineering
services in home country.
Urban planning (excluding  Mode  I  unbound  Mode 1. none for scheme  FULLY LIBERALIZED
general  urban planning)  Mode 2: none  design;  otherwise cooperation  EXCEPT FOR MODE I
Mode 3  unbound  with Chinese professional  RESTRICTIONS
organisations  is required
Mode  3.  only through an EJV  Mode  3  wholly foreign owned
or CJV  subsidiaries  permitted by
2006
Medical and dental services  Mode I  unbound  Mode 1 none  FULL FOREIGN
Mode 2  unbound  Mode 2  none  OWNERSHIP NOT
Mode 3  only through an EJV  Mode 3  foreign majority  ALLOWED AND NEEDS-
or CJV with a quantitative  ownership explicitly  BASED QUOTAS
limitation based on a needs  permitted, and not required to
test and approval by the  accept sole responsibility for
Ministry of Public Health  and  foreign exchange balance and
MOFTEC  CJV or EJV solely  profits and losses  But still
responsible  for foreign  subject to quantitative
exchange  balance and profits  limitations based on a needs
and losses.  Majority of  test
personnel must be Chinese  Mode 4  licenses can be
Mode 4  foreign doctors can  obtained from the Ministy of
provide services for six  Public Health, and a contract
months (may extend to a year)  is not required
provided  a license  is obtained
at provincial level and they are
contracted  by Chinese medical
institutions
COMPUTER  AND RELATED SERVICES
Sector  1 1994  1 2001
23Consultancy services related  to  Mode  I  Unbound  Modes  1-3  FULLY
the installation of computer  Mode 2  None  LIBERALIZED
hardware  Mode 3  None  Mode 4  Qualifications  BA
Data processing  and tabulation  Mode 4  Qualifications  BA  and 3 years experience
Time-sharing  and 5 years experience
Software  implementation  Mode  I  Unbound  Mode  I  Unbound
Systems and software  Mode 2  None  Mode 2  None
consulting  Mode 3  None  Mode 3  Only through JVs
Systems analysis  Mode 4  Qualifications  BA  with foreign majority
and 5 years experience  ownership permitted
Mode 4  Qualifications  BA
and 3 years expenence
Systems design  Mode  I  Unbound  Mode  I None
Programming  Mode 2  None  Mode 2  None
Systems maintenance  Mode 3  Through EJV only  Mode 3  Only through JVs
Data processing  Mode 4  Qualifications  BA  with foreign majority
Input preparation  and  5 years experience  ownership permitted
Mode 4  Qualifications  BA
and 3 years experience
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Sector  1994  2001  2008
Value added  No  commitments  Mode I  unclear  By 2002  expansion  in
Mode 2  None  geographical  area,  and foreign
Mode 3  Through JVs with a  investment limit to 49%
foreign investment limit of  By 2003  no geographic
30% only in Shanghai,  restriction  and FOREIGN
Guangzhou  and Beijing  INVESTMENT  LIMIT TO
50%
Basic telecommunications  No commitments  Mode I.  unclear  By 2002  expansion  in
mobile voice and data  Mode 2  None  geographical  area, and foreign
Mode 3  Through JVs with a  investment limit to 35%
foreign  investment limit of  By 2004  FOREIGN
25% only in and between  INVESTMENT  LIMIT TO
Shanghai, Guangzhou  and  49%
Beijing  By 2006  no geographic
restriction
Basic telecommunications  No commitments  Mode I  unclear  By 2004  through  JVs with a
fixed-line services  Mode 2  none  foreign investment limit of
Mode 3  unbound  25% only in and between
Shanghai,  Guangzhou  and
BeUijng.
By 2006  expansion in
geographical  area, and foreign
investment limit to 35%
By 2007  no geographic
restriction and  FOREIGN
INVESTMENT  LIMIT TO
CONSTRUCTION
Construction  and related  Mode I  unbound  Mode  I  unbound  RESTRICTIONS  ON
engineering  Mode 2  none  ,  Mode 2  none  BUSINESS SCOPE OF
Mode  3  unbound  Mode 3  Through JVs with  FULLY FOREIGN-OWNED
foreign majority ownership  ENTERPRISES
permitted and only foreign-
invested construction  projects.  Mode 3  By 2004, fully
foreign-owned  enterprises
permitted but only in projects
financed by foreign  investment
and/or grants, or by loans from




24Commission  agents and  No commitments  Mode I  unbound  LIBERALIZED  EXCEPT
wholesale trade,  and a full  Mode 2  none  CROSS BORDER
range of subordinated services,  Mode 3  Foreign-invested  DELIVERY  AND TWO
including after sales services  enterprises are permitted to  PRODUCTS
distribute their products
manufactured in China  Mode 3  By 2002, through
JVs subject to restrictions  on
products, to be phased out by
2006 (except salt and tobacco)
By 2003, foreign majority
ownership allowed and no
geographic or quantitative
restrictions
Retailing and a full  range of  Non commitments  Mode  1  unbound except for  CONTINUED
subordinated  services,  mail order  RESTRICTIONS  ON LARGE
including after sales services  Mode 2  none  CHAIN STORES
Mode 3  through JVs (not
foreign majority  controlled)  in  Mode 3  By 2003, all
5 SEZs and 8 cities  subject to  provincial capitals open and
quotas (e g  4 in Beijing and  by 2004,  no more geographical
Shanghai), restrictions on  restrictions,
products (not books,  by 2006,  no restrictions on
newspapers,  pharmaceuticals,  products,
pesticides,  chemical  fertilisers,  foreign majority control
etc)  allowed except in chain stores
with more than 30 outlets
selling a range of products
Franchising  No commitments  Mode  I  none  FULLY LIBERALIZED  BY
Mode 2  none  2004
Mode 3  unbound  Mode 3  By 2004, none
EDUCATIONAL  AND ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Educational services excluding  Mode  I.  unbound  Mode  I  none
special education (e g. mulitary  Mode 2.  none  Mode 2.  none
and political) and national  Mode 3  unbound  Mode 3.  ONLY THROUGH
compulsory  education  Mode 4  subject to licensing  JVs with foreign majority
from SBFE and  SEC, and  ownership permitted  (national
possession of MA and  treatment  unbound)
professional title  Mode 4  subject to invitation
or employment  by Chinese
institution, and possession  of
BA, 2 years experience,  and
professional title
Environmental  services  No commtiments  Mode  I  unbound except for
consultation services
Mode 2:  none




Insurance (except statutory  Mode  I  unbound  Mode  I  unbound except for  By 2004, FULLY
insurance)  Mode 2  unbound  intemational  maritime,  LIBERALIZED EXCEPT
Mode 3  through a branch or  aviation and transport  50%  FOREIGN
JV only in Shanghai,  subject  insurance  and reinsurance,  and  OWNERSHIP  LIMIT IN
to minimum local and global  certain  types of brokerage  LIFE INSURANCE
asset and local presence (as  Mode 2  none, but unbound
rep  office) requirements  for brokerage  Mode 3  By 2003, no
Mode 3  Form of  establishment restrictions in
establishment  Non-life  non-life
through a branch or JVs with  By 2004,  no geographic
51%  foreign ownership,  restrictions
Life  through JVs with 50%  By 2004, no restrictions on
foreign ownership  business scope
Geographic  limitation  only in  By 2005,  no cession
5 cities  requirement
25Business  scope  only selected
forms of non-life insurance
Life only to individuals,  not
groups
Licenses  no quotas but
subject to minimum asset and
duration of establishment
requirements
Upon accession,  a 20 per cent
cession required of  all  lines of
the primary risks for non-life,
personal  accident and health
insurance business with an
appointed Chinese
Reinsurance  Company
Banking  Mode  I  unbound  Mode  I  unbound except for  FULLY LIBERALIZED  BY
Mode 2  unbound  provision of data, advice, etc.  2006
Mode 3  through  a branch,  Mode 2  none.  Mode 3  Geographic
subsidiary JV only in specified  Mode 3  geographic limitation  limitations phased out
regions, subject to minimum  none for foreign currency  gradually by 2006
asset and local presence (as  business, but local currency  Clients  local currency
rep  office) requirements,  only  in 4 cities  Inter-regional  business with Chinese
acceptance of deposits only  supply of services permitted  enterprises  by 2003 and all
from non-residents  in foreign  Clients  only foreign currency  clients by 2006
currencies  (with some  business
exceptions),  and no  loans to  Licenses'  only prudential
Chinese citizens  cntena
Securities  No commitments.  Mode  I'  unbound except B  Mode 3  by 2004, 49%
share business  foreign ownership in JVs to
Mode 2:  none  conduct domestic secunties
Mode 3.  Unbound, except rep.  investment fund management
offices may become special  business,  and through JVs
members of CSEs, and  with up to 33%  foreign
through JVs with up to 33%  ownership to underwrite A
foreign ownership to conduct  shares, and underwrite and
domestic securities investment  trade B and H shares, as well
fund management  business  as govemment  and corporate
debts, launching of funds
TOURISM AND TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES
Hotels  Mode  1. unbound  Mode  I  unbound  FULLY LIBERALIZED  BY
Mode 2  None  Mode 2  None  2005
Mode 3  though JVs subject  Mode 3  though JVs with
to needs test at central and  foreign majority ownership
local levels  perminted
Travel  agency and tour  No commitments  Mode  I  unbound  FULLY LIBERALIZED  BY
operator  Mode 2  None  2007
Mode  3- though JVs subject
to geographical  and business
scope restrictions
TRANSPORT  SERVICES
A  Maritime Transport
Intemational transport  Mode  I  none  Mode  I  none
Mode 2  none  Mode  2  none
Mode-3:  unbound  Mode  3  though JVs subject
to 49% foreign ownership
limits to operate only a
._____  _____  _____  _____  -____________  C  hinese-flag  fleet
Auxiliary services  - Mode 1.  unbound  Mode 1. unbound
Mode 2  N6ne  Mode  2  None
Mode 3  though JVs only  Mode 3  though JVs only,
with foreign  majority
= e-  - - oWnership  permitted
B  Intemal  waterways  Mode  l-  o6nly-mitemational  As in 1994
shipping in ports open to
I foreign vessels permitted
26Mode 2  None
Mode 3  unbound
C  Air transport
Aircraft  repair and  No commitments  Mode I  unbound
maintenance  Mode 2  None
Mode 3  though Chinese
controlled JVs and subject to
an economic needs test
Computer reservation  No commtitments  Mode 1. by connection  with
Chinese CRS,  etc
Mode 2:  None
Mode 3:  unbound
E  Rail transport  No commitments  Mode I  none  FULLY LIBERALIZED BY
Mode 2  none  2007
Mode 3  though JVs with a  (Mode 3  majority ownership
foreign ownership limit of  by 2004)
49%
F  Road transport (freight)  Mode  1:  unbound  Mode  I  none  FULLY LIBERALIZED BY
Mode 2.  None  Mode 2  none  2004
Mode 3  though JVs subject  Mode 3  though JVs with a  (Mode 3  majority ownership
an economic  needs test  foreign ownership limit of  by 2002)
49%.
H  Services auxiliary  to all
modes of transport
Storage and warehousing  Commitments only for  Mode  I  unbound  FULLY LIBERALIZED BY
maritime transport,  as above  Mode 2  none  2004
Mode 3  though JVs with a  (Mode 3  majority ownership
foreign ownership  limit of  by 2002)
49%.
Freight forwarding  agency  Commitments only for  Mode  I  none  FULLY LIBERALIZED  BY
services)  maritime transport,  as above  Mode 2  none  2005
Mode 3.  though JVs with a  (Mode 3.  majority ownership
foreign ownership  limit of  by 2002)
50% and subject to minimum
capital  requirements.
27Annex Table 1: CHINA  - Structure  of market access commitments
Sector  Mode  1  Mode 2  Mode 3  Mode 4
_F  P  N  F  P  N  F  P  N  F  P  N
Business  Services
Legal Services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  I  0  0  1  0
Accounting/auditing/bookkeeping  I  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Architectural  Services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  I  0  0  1  0
Medical & dental services  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Data processing services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
R&D services  (natural  sciences)  0  I  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  °  °
Advertising services  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Management consulting services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Communication  Services
Courier services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Voice telephone services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Private  leased circuit services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  I  0
Electronic mail  0  I  0  I  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Online info & data base retrieval  0  I  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Audiovisual  services  0  I  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Construction, Engineering
Construction  work (building)  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Construction work (civil  engin.)  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Distribution
Wholesale trade  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  1  0
Retailing services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Educational Services
Secondary education  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  I  0  0  1  0
Adult education  0  0  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Environmental Services
Sewage services  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Refuse disposal  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Financial Services
Non-life insurance  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Acceptance of deposits  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Lending of all types  0  1  0  0  I  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Trading in securities  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0




Hotels and restaurants  I  0  0  I  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0





Maritime (freight)  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Rail (passenger)
Rail (freight)  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
Road (passenger)
Road (freight)  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  0
TOTAL OF ABOVE  7  20  4  10  21  0  0  31  0  0  31  0
(31  sub-sector)  _
23  64  13  32%  68  0%  0T  100  0  0  100%  0
_  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  %
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Source  World Bank/]TU Telecommunications  Policy Database
Notes  The percentage  figures  indicate  the  share  of private equity  ownership  in the  incumbent  operator
Local,  LD  and  ILD  refer  to  the  local,  long  distance  and  international  fixed-line  service  segments,
respectively  The number  in the mobile row corresponds  to the number of cellular operators  in the country
"Regulation"  only captures the existence of a separate  regulatory agency.
Source  Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran  (2001).
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